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One explanation for the rapid deployment might be that learning and competition have driven down costs making the technology competitive (Neij 2008; Junginger, van Sark et al. 2010 ).
This is clearly not the case: OSW remains amongst the most expensive RET (IEA 2012) and costs have increased (Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010; IEA 2012b) . A second possible explanation is that policy support makes the technology investible, which is the case in the UK (Toke 2011; IEA 2012b) . However, analysis needs to explain why these policies came about and how technology advocates were able to shape a favourable space for deployment.
This is a distinct gap in the existing literature (Markard and Petersen 2009; Green and Vasilakos 2011; Toke 2011; Luo, Lacal-Arantegui et al. 2012 ).
For insights into technology advocacy, we turn to the literature on the importance of niches within wider processes of socio-technical transformation (see Raven 2007; Schot and Geels 2008; Smith, Voß et al. 2010; Markard, Raven et al. 2012) . In this literature niches are conceptualised as 'protective spaces' where real world experimentation takes place (Kemp, Schot et al. 1998 ). Smith and Raven (2012) suggest a particularly relevant framework. They argue that understanding RET deployment requires analysis to trace recursively between the agency creating space for development, and how the characteristics of that space shape the socio-technical configuring 1 : the further development of the technology within a social context ( Figure 1 ).
1 Configuring refers to the fact that the shape of emerging technologies is often not yet settled in the early stages of development (e.g. there is no dominant design, business model, or developed supply chain yet). Taking this framework as the point of departure, we answer two questions:
1. How and by whom has 'protective space' been created for offshore wind in the UK?
2. What impact has the 'protective space' had on offshore wind developments in the UK?
The development of OSW is only one piece of the puzzle of electricity system transformations in the UK (Foxon, Hammond et al. 2010; Foxon 2013) . Policy makers are trying to meet the challenging RE and climate change targets by using a variety of support instruments for RETs, nuclear, carbon capture and storage as well as energy efficiency.
Controversies abound around the degree of centralisation or decentralisation as well as the relative prominence of these technologies in different decarbonisation pathways. Many of these technologies have received increased policy attention over the last couple of years. Our analysis focusses on OSW as this technology has been most successful in deployment.
Support for OSW has complemented rather than replaced support for other technologies.
Analysis of the interactions between OSW and other low carbon technologies is an interesting subject but is beyond the scope of this paper.
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The framework and methodology are explained in the next section before turning to a history of OSW (section 3). Section 4 analyses the actor networks and narratives constructing 'protective space' for OSW, answering the first question. Section 5 analyses how this 'protective space' shaped developments in OSW, answering the second question. This is followed by a discussion of results in section 6 and conclusions in section 7.
2. Analytical,framework,and,methodology,
Protective,space,
The transitions literature analyses the transformation of socio-technical regimes in energy, transport or food systems (Geels 2002; Elzen, Geels et al. 2004; Smith, Stirling et al. 2005; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Smith, Voß et al. 2010) . A key argument is that sustainable technologies often fit poorly within established regimes (e.g. in terms of price, performance, consumer preferences) (Smith 2007) . Therefore emphasis is put on the provision of 'protective space', i.e. niches, to improve performance and societal embedding of technologies, and facilitate wider breakthrough into dominant regimes (Kemp, Schot et al. 1998 ).
2.2 Nurturing,,shielding,and,empowering,as,processes,of,socio? technical,configuring, Smith and Raven (2012) propose a framework for analysing 'protective space' which suggests productive niches require three processes: nurturing, shielding and empowering.
They argue that successful nurturing involves learning, the building of positive, robust expectations, and the formation of broad and deep networks. Shielding processes provide temporary relief for niches against adverse selection environments of incumbent regimes.
Empowering involves actors network who represent niches positively to the wider social world in order to mobilise resources. Empowering can be achieved through two processes:
5 either the new socio-technical configuration becomes increasingly competitive under the existing selection environment ('fit and conform') or the selection environment is changed in order to better accommodate the characteristics of the novel socio-technical configuration ('stretch and transform'). The framework not only focusses on niche-level processes (nurturing and shielding), but also explores niche-regime dynamics through the concept of empowering. Technology advocates engage in both inward-oriented work to improve the performance of the core technology as well as outward-oriented socio-political work to influence the status of the technology in the wider social world.
Smith and Raven argue that evidence for these ideal-typical processes requires analysis of the actors, their networks and the narratives used to promote the niche. Narratives can help to create positive expectations about the niche, make claims for reforms and critique existing regimes. Actors and their networks are important in studying the politics of creating 'protective space' as it is actors who negotiate the mobilisation of resources, represent lessons to be drawn, lobby policy makers, and (re-)produce narratives. This framework has already been applied to explaining PV developments in the Netherlands (Verhees, Raven et al. 2013) and the UK (Smith, Kern et al. 2014 ). Here we apply it to the case of OSW.
Methodology,
A case study methodology is appropriate for our aims, where we study a situation involving a complex and contemporary social phenomenon un-attributable to a clearly identified single cause (Yin 1994) . The analysis used a process tracing approach to identify causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005: 6) . The study is based on a systematic review of the academic literature, policy and stakeholder documents, relevant trade press and media articles (including ENDS, Real Power, BBC and Wind Power Monthly). The resulting history is 6 complemented with data on public R&D funding and deployment. The evidence was used to construct a timeline of developments. Semi-structured interviews with 13 stakeholders involved in OSW were conducted between April and May 2012 (see Appendix A) to explore why processes were happening and how these processes shaped the development of OSW.
All interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed using the indicators specified in Figure   2 . Source: developed by authors, partly based on (Verhees, Raven et al. 2013) (Bilgili, Yasar et al. 2011 ). In the same year the Crown Estate (CE) awarded 13 Round 1 leases for OSWF (Toke 2011) . The CE is a company set up by government to manage Crown owned land which includes most of the UK seabed outside the 12mn zone. Its profits go back to the Treasury. Developers need a license to develop an OSWF and have to pay a fee to the CE. The government also announced capital grants for OSWF under which projects received up to £10m (BWEA, 2010) . However, developments on the ground were slow (see Figure 3) . The most recent period is characterised by a step change in government involvement in OSWF as well as rapid deployment (Figure 3 ). During this period, the UK turned from a relative laggard in terms of RE deployment (Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 2006 ) to a frontrunner in terms of OSW installed capacity (Toke 2011) .
source: own illustration, data from Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010 and DECC 2012 Given the challenging renewables and climate targets, the Department of Energy and Climate
Change (DECC) argued that large scale industrial development of OSW is essential to bring One important element was a change of the Renewables Obligation (RO), which had done little to support OSW (Woodman and Mitchell 2011 essential to the continued development of OSW (Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010: 94) .
Another important element of this acceleration process was Round 3 of the Crown Estates' licensing in which 9 zones with a potential for 25GW were offered. While in Rounds 1 and 2 developers bid for self-proposed sites, the CE now became more strategically involved, identifying zones which had the greatest economic potential. The CE also started to co-invest alongside developers and implemented a new Zone Appraisal and Planning process designed to reduce risks to project delivery and accelerate the programme.
Ongoing changes to electricity market rules are intended to incentivise investment in low carbon technologies including OSW, nuclear power and carbon capture and storage. A package of instruments, including paying electricity providers a fixed premium price above the electricity price (so-called 'contracts for difference'), is currently going through the legislative process (Kern, Kuzemko et al. forthcoming 4. The,creation,of, protective,space ,for,offshore,wind,
Main,actors,and,their,networks,
The recent deployment of OSW is led by a number of large utility and energy companies (Table 1) . For a more extensive overview of actors involved in OSW, please see Appendix B.
12 In summary, a highly networked coalition of powerful and resourceful actors emerged which helped boost the credibility of and channelled resources into OSW. Formal networks centre around key public organisations as well as incumbent energy regime actors. Small independent companies which were very active in the beginning have fallen away or play a minor role. Environmental groups also helped create space for offshore wind by supporting the technology.
Narratives,
Analysis of the narratives actor networks used to enrol support for OSW, identified a range of frequently used claims. These portray offshore wind as:
-helping to meet renewable energy and carbon reduction targets;
-contributing to energy security;
-creating jobs;
-utilising a currently unexploited resource ; and -escaping from onshore wind planning issues.
The most obvious narrative is that the technology is key to meeting renewable energy and carbon targets as well as tackling energy security. After agreeing to the EU targets several government publications argued that OSW "will play an important part in meeting Britain's renewable energy and carbon emission reduction targets as well as improving energy security Also the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) concluded: "there is an important role for offshore wind as part of the least cost path for decarbonising the power sector" (CCC 2010).
Wind industry proponents even argued that "At a time when climate change climbs to the top of the political agenda, wind energy continues to be the only advanced technology ready and able to deliver renewable power on a large scale" (Real Power, 2006b : 2).
Already in 1998 Border Wind claimed that a UK wind energy industry could create 36,000
jobs by 2010 (ENDS 1998). However, it is in the most recent period, during a time of economic recession, when rhetoric about re-balancing the economy away from financial services towards manufacturing became salient, that this narrative has gained traction within government. OSW is portrayed as a key sector in which the UK can create economic value.
Advocates were asking for serious state backing to kick-start private investment by referring to promises of an additional 70,000 jobs and a £60 billion economic boost by 2020 (Real Power, 2010) . A senior civil servant in DECC argued: "it is my judgement given that this [deployment support] is funded from consumer bills, it is not credible for me not to take an interest in the jobs argument" (interviewee 13).
Another narrative was the availability of an unexploited resource and offshore engineering skills (Real Power, 2006: 6; interviewee 1; 3). Civil servants indicated that a key starting point for the Low Carbon Industrial Strategy was to identify where the UK has a natural opportunity: in offshore wind "we have better resources than anyone else proportionally" Another strategy was to position OSW as an escape from the onshore wind planning and public acceptability issues (interviewees 4; 5; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12) . The CEO of DONG is reported to have said: "We're going offshore, offshore is invisible…we don't bother any of the inhabitants, we don't change the landscape onshore" (interviewee 9); also see (Trident Energy, 2011) . This is also purported to have been a strong motive for policy makers to support the move offshore (interviewee 10); also see (Jones and Eiser 2010) .
However, OSW has also been contested. Group was taken over by Vestas and Borderwind was taken over by AMEC, a consultancy, engineering and project management firm mainly working for the oil and gas industry). The management of Borderwind early on was aware of the fact that to play an important role in offshore wind a larger company was required so they sold Borderwind to AMEC (interviewee 5). However, this also meant that important and resourceful actors entered the offshore wind niche.
Only later on the emergence of climate change on the political agenda provided a window of opportunity for OSW advocates to obtain protective space to enable further development and deployment. In this later phase the Crown Estate became a very proactive and a trusted actor with close links to government and other public bodies while also being credible with business actors. The CE therefore can be seen as a 'system builder' in Hughes' sense (1979) who related 'everything to a single central vision', reached out beyond their special competences and played an entrepreneurial, system building role. These developments are argued to constitute the kind of 'protective space' the literature refers to.
5. What,impact,did,the,'protective,space',have,on,offshore,wind, developments?,
Shielding,of,offshore,wind,developments,
With OSW unable to compete with incumbent technologies, the analysis identified a number of specific processes shielding the niche from regime selection pressures that enabled its continued development.
During the early period of our analysis, very few resources were spent on public R&D. What little R&D into renewables emerged in the 1970s ended in the 1980s. A member of a judging panel for the Science and Engineering Council in 1987-88 recalled: "We had a significant number of wind projects...We used to say the pump has been primed. We don't need to fund any more research" (interviewee 12; also interviewees 10; 11). Public funding remained low until the mid-2000s ( Figure 5 ). Since then energy R&D funding has been rising "prompted by the drive for efficiency improvements and overall cost reduction" (Halliday and Ruddell 2010: 2). funding to increase the capabilities of the supply chain. The research councils also started to put significant funding into the engineering skills base (see Table 2 for a list of initiatives). Source: authors own; data from a variety of sources, including interviews, public announcements Looking at the impact shielding processes had on OSW developments, the argument is that the nature of the shielding provided by the policy framework (especially the RO) made a difference to the way offshore wind developed. The 'protective space' mainly provided shielding for a particular socio-technical configuration: large scale installations by big utilities or energy companies which were able to take on the risks and deliver the required scale of the activity and fund projects on their balance sheet whereas many of the smaller firms active in earlier phases struggled to do so. This also had an effect on turbine manufacturers. Companies like Daywind, which had developed small wind turbines mainly sold to cooperatives, small businesses and farmers in Germany, struggled to break into the UK market: "the people interested in wind were big developers or big construction companies" (interviewee 12) looking for large projects with large wind turbines -mainly provided by Vestas and Siemens. The analysis also showed that shielding initiatives have grown both in terms of funding and in numbers over the last few years which has given a substantial boost to innovation activities aimed at reducing costs and upscaling the size of the turbines (see next section).
Nurturing,offshore,wind,
In terms of learning processes, a number of observations can be made. Actors were learning lessons from projects abroad such as Horn's Reef in Denmark (interviewee 5) but UK pilot projects like Blyth were also important. One of the lessons learned was that increasing the turbine size was important to offset high costs and access higher wind speeds (interviewees 1; 5; 11). The harsh operating conditions meant that turbines and foundations had to be much more robust than onshore. The analysis above already showed the increasing resource commitment in terms of investments (see Table 1 ) and in terms of public support for OSW (see Table 2 ). The broad membership and the deepening commitments by these networks had a positive impact on the development of OSW activity.
Empowering,offshore,wind,
Empowering involves networks of actors representing niche configurations to the wider world in an attempt to mobilise resources for niche development and to help change the selection environment. Because the processes of representing niche configurations and mobilising resources have been covered in section 4, the analysis here focuses on changes to the selection environment. Arguably, actors have been quite successful in portraying OSW in a positive way and have received significant resources, but for OSW to become competitive with incumbent regime technologies either OSW improves up to a point when it can fit into the existing electricity regime ('fit and conform') or the selection environment is adjusted to accommodate OSW ('stretch and transform').
The analysis reveals that there are a number of ways in which technology advocates, powerful business actors and policy makers shaped the selection environment to make it more amenable to OSW. The most important development in this context is the Electricity Market Reform . This represents a radical overhaul of the electricity markets rules in order to empower investment in low carbon generation by introducing long-term feed-in tariffs for a number of low carbon electricity technologies including OSW (Kern, Kuzemko et al. forthcoming). The contracts-for-difference guarantee investors an above market price for the electricity generated and will replace the RO by 2017.
Another important instance of empowering is a change of rules implemented under the EU Third Energy Package (European Commission 2007). This EU policy did not allow OSW developers to build and operate transmission cables connecting the wind farm to the grid 2 .
Several interviewees mentioned this rule as an obstacle to investment because any delay in 2 Because of the separation of generation and transmission for competition reasons.
26 grid connection will lead to a loss of revenue. Following pressure Ofgem addressed this concern by allowing the 'generator-build option' (Crown Estate 2011b). 3 In the words of a government minister: 'we had to get Ofgem to stop being pedantically market driven' (cited in: Toke 2011: 528) which addressed industry concerns (interviewees 6; 8; 12).
A third example of change in the selection environment is an alteration in the planning rules for Round 3 projects. Special procedures were set up for large wind farms which were given precedence ahead of other considerations including the allocating of Natura 2000 conservation sites (Toke 2011: 528) . This was addressing industry concerns that planning processes were cumbersome and introduce delays (interviewees 3; 6; 8; 12).
In addition to these examples of 'stretch and transform' empowering, advocates also utilised 'fit and conform' strategies. For example the recent emphasis on cost reductions is part of a strategy to make OSW at least competitive with other low carbon options if not conventional generation.
In summary, we argue that these empowering processes have contributed to the further development and deployment of OSW by helping to overcome some specific barriers but also by providing 'political signposts' that the government is serious about OSW. As a renewable energy developer put it: "That's made quite a difference I think, just generally because it gives people more confidence in the higher risk development stage to invest. So planning reforms and electricity market reforms which have been much more heavily dominated towards offshore wind than ever before" (interviewee 8).
27 5.4 Summary,of,shielding,,nurturing,and,empowering,processes, Table 3 provides a summary of the main findings of the analysis. 6 All of these actors are highly resource interdependent, meaning that they rely on each other to meet their respective interests. We argue that it is this resource interdependency in terms of investment, capabilities and skills, policy frameworks and legitimacy which provided the glue for the OSW network and which was absent in the earlier phases.
Our analysis demonstrates how the close alignment of economic and political interests of key actors within the specific context of the UK has led to the rapid deployment of OSW -by circumventing anti-onshore wind protest in the short term and meeting 2020 renewables targets in the medium term but at potentially high economic and political costs when the further deployment of OSW adds up to a significant impact on electricity bills.
Conclusions,and,policy,implications,
This paper has sought to explain the recent burst of activity in OSW in the UK by examining the dynamics of the development of 'protective space'. We showed that a variety of public and private actors were involved in the creation of a 'protective space' for OSW since the 1970s, initially with very limited effect. To create support for the niche actors strategically linked OSW to a variety of policy goals. While initially supporters had a hard time to enrol powerful private and public actors, developments abroad (Denmark and Germany) as well as changing contexts (including renewables targets and the recent focus on manufacturing jobs) 32 provided a window of opportunity for OSW advocates. An important role in this process was played by the Crown Estate who took the lead in bringing together actors.
The analysis also suggested that processes of shielding, nurturing and empowering shaped the development of OSW in specific ways. For example early niche learning processes led to a shared understanding that OSW turbines needed to be larger and much more robust. Public and private R&D investment was channelled towards addressing these problems. We suggest that empowering OSW in this case was aided by the fact that the niche (at least in the later phases) was created by relatively homogenous networks of powerful actors promoting one socio-technical configuration (large scale offshore wind farms). The research showed a distinct lack of disagreement among advocates of OSW about the strategic direction although technical details vary. In addition, credibility was bestowed onto this technology by the interest and investment of utility companies, large manufacturing firms, oil and gas firms as well as DECC and the CE. In terms of the actors interested in OSW, these are closely associated with the existing regime as the configuration of multi-MW wind parks fits well into existing electricity regimes.
We argue that the framework suggested by Smith and Raven explains the recent burst of OSW deployment in the UK through embedding these developments into a longer process of political struggles around the desirability and feasibility of the technology. The protected space enabled early processes of socio-technical configuring to take place by experimenting with the technology and different contractual arrangements but most importantly by building broad and powerful coalitions and aligning political and economic interests of key actors.
When political pressure for the expansion of renewable electricity mounted, these coalitions were able to respond and rapidly deploy several GWs. The analysis provides a different kind 33 of deeper and historical explanation for the development of OSW compared to policy or economic analysis. In how far these lessons from the UK relate to developments in other countries remains to be seen, but the paper has at least demonstrated the usefulness of the perspective to explain UK OSW developments which is of relevance to other countries given the leading role of the UK.
In terms of policy implications, two points can be made:
First, the analysis shows that substantive change can happen ('from laggard to leader') when renewable energy policy ambitions link up with interests of powerful regime actors and tie in with economic concerns about growth, jobs and energy security, state revenue, and investment by manufacturers. The alignment of interests led to an increased legitimacy of the technology despite rising costs and thereby enabled the large scale deployment. For renewables advocates and policy makers, the analysis therefore points to the importance of building such coalitions in order to strengthen the case for RET.
Second, the analysis shows that the existence of a 'system builder' was very beneficial for the development of offshore wind in the UK. The Crown Estate took a very proactive and multifaceted approach to OSW. In many other countries administrative bodies responsible for granting licenses are dominated by bureaucratic practices rather than an entrepreneurial mind-set. We argue that countries that are serious about the large scale deployment of offshore wind should look at the UK model and see whether the kinds of functions the Crown Estate fulfils (e.g. in terms of providing a platform for industry and government actors to come together, co-investing up to the point of consent, having a commercial mind-set and performing facilitative actions e.g. with regard to the supply chain) are present and if not, what kind of body might be set up to fulfil these functions.
Future research should analyse developments in OSW within the wider dynamics of energy transitions as different pathways interact with one another: both positively in terms of synergies (like the ones observed between offshore and onshore wind developments) but also in terms of competition (e.g. between centralised nuclear power and decentralised solar PV pathways).
